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AZURIX CORP. v. ARGENTINE REPUBLIC:
TRIBUNAL RULING IN FAVOR
OF FOREIGN INVESTOR REQUIRES

"PRO-ACTIVE BEHAVIOR" BY THE HOST
STATE TO ENCOURAGE AND PROTECT
FOREIGN INVESTMENT UNDER THE FAIR
AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT STANDARD
OF U.S.-ARGENTINA

BIT

Tyson Wanjura*

I.

INTRODUCTION

HE obligation to provide "fair and equitable treatment" is often
stated as part of the protection due to foreign investment by host
countries.' The fair and equitable treatment standard has been
given various interpretations and has been the subject of much discussion
in recent years.2 The discussion has focused mainly on "whether the standard of treatment required is measured against the customary international law minimum standard, a broader international law standard
including other ... protection obligations" found in bilateral investment
treaties (BITs), or "whether the standard is an autonomous self-contained concept in treaties which do not explicitly link it to international
3
law."

The scope of fair and equitable treatment has been addressed by several arbitral tribunals under both chapter 11 of the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and individual BITs. This note examines the
July 14, 2006, Azurix arbitral tribunal ruling and the analysis of the scope
of the fair and equitable treatment standard as found in the U.S.-ArgenCandidate, Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law, 2008;
B.A., Baylor University, 2000. Upon graduation from law school, the author will
practice in corporate finance with an international law firm in Dallas, Texas. This
article was written in the fall of 2006 and does not reflect any recent developments
in the law.
1. Catherine Yannaca-Small, Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International
Investment Law 2 (Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev. [OECD], Working Papers on International Investment No. 2004/3, 2004) [hereinafter OECD Fair and
*J.D.

Equitable Treatment].
2. Id.
3. Id.
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tina BIT. This note first considers the fair and equitable treatment standard generally, as used in BITs and customary international law. Second,
this note examines the Azurix tribunal's ruling and provides an interpretation of the status of the standard in light of this ruling.
II.

FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT IN INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW GENERALLY

"Fair and equitable treatment" is not often a defined term in a BIT.
Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention requires that a treaty be "interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given
to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and
purpose."' 4 The proper interpretation of the fair and equitable treatment
standard "may be influenced by the specific wording of a particular
treaty, its context.., or other indications of the parties' intent."'5 Generally, investors seek a broad interpretation for greater investment protection, while host states seek a restrictive interpretation to limit their
liability to foreign investors. 6 "Essentially, the purpose of the clause as
used in BIT practice is to fill gaps which may be left by the more specific
standards, in order to obtain the level of investor protection intended by
the treaties." 7
One of the most restricted views of the fair and equitable treatment
standard was articulated in Genin, a 2001 tribunal ruling. 8 According to
the Genin tribunal, for state conduct to breach the fair and equitable
treatment standard, it would need to reflect "a wilful neglect of duty, an
insufficiency of action falling far below international standards, or even
subjective bad faith."9 The language used by the Genin tribunal is similar
to that of a ruling of the U.S.-Mexican Mixed General Claims Commission in the 1926 Neer case. 10 The Neer commission concluded that a state
has breached the international minimum standard when conduct of the
state amounts "to an outrage, to bad faith, to wilful neglect of duty, or to
an insufficiency of governmental action so far short of international standards that every reasonable and impartial man would readily recognize
its insufficiency." 11 The Neer case was based on the view that the minimum standard "will only provide for minimal obligations of the host state
4. See Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, art.
31(1), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 340, 8 I.L.M. 679, 691-92 [hereinafter Vienna
Convention].
5. OECD Fair and Equitable Treatment, supra note 1, at 2.
6. Courtney Kirkman, Note, Fairand Equitable Treatment: Methanex v. United States
and the NarrowingScope of NAFTA Article 1105, 34 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 343,

346 (2002).
7. Rudolf Dolzer, Fair and Equitable Treatment: A Key Standard in Investment Trea-

ties, 39 INT'L LAW. 87, 90 (2005).
8. Genin v. Republic of Estonia, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/99/2, 367 (2001).
9. Id.
10. C. Van Vollenhoven & G. Fernandez MacGregor, L. F H. Neer and Pauline E.
Neer v. Mexico, 21 AM. J. INT'L L. 555, 555-57 (1927) (discussing the case Neer v.
Mexico case from the U.S.-Mexico General Claims Commission in 1926).
11. Id. at 556.
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and in this sense only provide for minimal protection of the alien."'1 2
In more recent years, the scope of the fair and equitable treatment
standard has expanded, and the tendency is "to consider the standard as
embracing the notions of due process and denial of justice."'1 3 On July 31,
2001, the Free Trade Commission clarified the scope of NAFTA's article
1105 fair and equitable treatment provision. 14 Arbitral tribunals under
NAFTA have found, after this interpretation,' that the customary international law to be applied is the international standard as it has evolved, as
opposed to the 1926 standard. 15 In Mondev, 16 the tribunal made it clear
that "the content of the minimum standard today cannot be limited to the
content of customary international law as recognised in arbitral decisions
in the 1920s.' 7 The tribunal further found that "what is unfair or inequitable need not equate with the outrageous or the egregious. In particular,
a State may treat foreign investment unfairly and inequitably without
necessarily acting in bad faith."' 18 The Loewen' 9 tribunal similarly concluded that "[n]either State practice, the decisions of international tribunals nor the opinion of commentators support the view that bad faith or
malicious intention is an essential element of unfair and inequitable treatment or denial of justice amounting to a breach of international
20
justice."
The evolution away from the restricted scope of Genin continued in
Tecmed, 2 1 Waste Management,22 and CMS.2 3 In Tecmed, just and equitable treatment is described as requiring:
the Contracting Parties to provide to international investments treatment that does not affect the basic expectations that were taken into
account by the foreign investor to make the investment. The foreign
investor expects the host State to act in a consistent manner, free
from ambiguity
and totally transparently in its relations with the for24
eign investor.
12. Dolzer, supra note 7, at 93.
13. Id.
14. Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions (NAFTA Free Trade
Commission, July 31, 2001), http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/NAFTA-Interpren.asp.
15. Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/12,
368 (2006).
16. Mondev Int'l Ltd. v. United States, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2,
123 (2002).
17. Id.
18. Id. 116.
19. Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3,
132 (2003).
20. Id.
21. Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID (W.
Bank) Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, $ 154 (2003).
22. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No.
ARB(AF)/00/3, T 98 (2004).
23. CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No.
ARB/01/8, T 280 (2005).
24. Tecmed, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, T 154.
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The Waste Management tribunal reached the conclusion that:
the minimum standard of treatment of fair and equitable treatment
is infringed by conduct attributable to the State and harmful to the
claimant if the conduct is arbitrary, grossly unfair, unjust or idiosyncratic, is discriminatory and exposes the claimant2 5to sectional or racial prejudice, or involves a lack of due process.
The CMS tribunal recently stated that it is an objective standard "unrelated to whether the Respondent has had any deliberate intention or bad
faith in adopting the measures in question. Of course, such intention and
bad faith can aggravate the situation but are not an essential element of
the standard. ''2 6 As noted by the Azurix tribunal, "[e]xcept for Genin,
there is a common thread in the recent awards under NAFTA and
Tecmed which does not require bad faith or malicious intention of the
recipient State as a necessary
element in the failure to treat investment
'27
fairly and equitably.
III.

AZURIX CORP. V. ARGENTINE REPUBLIC
A.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In 1996, the Province of Buenos Aires (Province) passed a law to privatize the water and sewer services, at the time controlled by the Administracion General de Obras Sanitarias de la Provincia de Buenos Aires
(AGOSBA). 28 Organismo Regulador de Aguas Bonaerense (ORAB), 29a
new regulatory authority, was created to oversee the future operator.
A bidding process was conducted, and ultimately the bid was successfully
won by Azurix AGOSBA S.R.L. (AAS) and Operadora de Buenos Aires
S.R.L. (OBA), two indirect subsidiaries of the Azurix group of companies. 30 Azurix, a subsidiary of ENRON Corporation, created the two entities for the purpose of the bid. 31 Having won the bid, AAS and OBA
created Azurix Buenos Aires S.A. (ABA) to act as the concessionaire in
32
Argentina.
On June 30, 1999, ABA, AGOSBA, and the Province executed the concession agreement, which granted ABA a thirty-year concession for the
distribution of potable water as well as the treatment and disposal of sewage in the Province. 33 As part of the bidding conditions, Azurix accepted
joint responsibility for the obligations of AAS and further committed itself to undertake any action necessary to ensure that OBA would succeed
in fulfilling the obligations set forth in the concession agreement as oper25.

Waste Mgmt., ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3, 1 98.

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

CMS, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/8, 280.
Azurix Corp., ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/12,
Id. 9[38.
Id.
Id. 1 40-41.
Id. 40.

32.

Id. T141.

372.

33. Id. As part of the agreement, ABA made a payment of 438,555,554 Argentine
pesos to the Province. Id.
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ator of the concession during the35 first twelve years. 3 4 The transfer of service took place on July 1, 1999.
From the start of the take-over, ABA as concessionaire complained
that the Province was letting political concerns interfere with the tariffs to
be charged to water customers. On August 4, 1999, ORAB issued a resolution that precluded ABA from charging non-metered service customers
more than what AGOSBA chargedprior to the take-over. 36 ORAB also
ordered ABA to credit the amounts that exceeded prior AGOSBA
amounts. 37 ABA claims the actions of ORAB were politically motivated
because the government of the Province was concerned that higher water
bills would damage the election chances of the favored presidential candidate Eduardo Duhalde. 3 8 Statements from the Minister of Public Works
were issued in the press claiming that the bills issued by ABA were incorrect and "that consumers should not pay them until the issue was
clarified."39
ABA further complained that the property records of water users were
not updated by the Province's Privatization Committee, and without such
records, ABA would not be able to increase the tariffs for properties with
valuation increases. 40 ABA identified about 60,000 non-metered customers whose properties reflected such a valuation increase, and in January
2000, ABA informed ORAB that it would enact a higher tariff scale for
these customers. 41 In February 2000, the ORAB issued a resolution directing ABA not to enact the higher42 tariff scale until the valuation increases were verified by the ORAB.
Controversy erupted in April 2000 when an algae outbreak
caused the
with
an earthhazy
and
"cloudy
and
to
appear
water in the reservoirs
musty taste and odor."'43 Azurix claimed that ABA's control of the water
treatment was not a factor that resulted in the algae bloom and that the
algae bloom could not have been foreseen by the ABA given the terms of
the concession agreement. 44 Under the concession agreement, algae removal works were to be completed by the Province and then transferred
45
without charge to ABA.
The algae removal works should have consisted of a micro-filtering
plant, refurbishment of WTP filters, an equipartition system, and the construction of a chlorine dioxide dosing facility. 46 But the micro-filtration
34. Id.
35. Id.

42.
41.

36. Id.

83.

37. Id.
38. Id. $ 85.

39. Id.
40. Id. $91 93-94.
41. Id. 9194.

42. Id.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. 91124.
Id. $ 124, 132-133.
Id. 91120.
Id. $1122.
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plant:
permitted raw untreated water to by-pass microfiltration, the Direct
Filtration system was only partially completed and the items installed
were never connected, the Equipartition System was only partially
completed and did not allow even distribution of water to the filter
modules... and the Chorine Dioxide Dosing system was defective4 in
its design and construction and posed operational safety hazards. 7
It became a major media and political event. The governor invited the
citizens not to pay their water bills. 48 ABA was directed by the ORAB to
discount invoices from April 12 and eventually even passed a resolution
that prevented ABA from billing any customers until the service was
49
restored.
Azurix's investment began a downward spiral at this point as it failed
to secure the $311 million in financing it needed to comply with the goals
of the concession. 50 The overseas private investment corporation in
which Azurix was seeking the financing rejected the application, identifying issues with the uncertainty on tariffs and the unclear commitment of
the Province to the concession. 51 Azurix filed a request for arbitration
against the Republic of Argentina with the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) on September 19, 2001.52
On October 5, 2001, ABA terminated the concession agreement. 53 The
Province rejected ABA's termination of the concession agreement
through an executive order on November 1, 2001 and further ordered
ABA "to refrain from engaging in conduct that would disturb the provision of the service." '54 ABA filed for bankruptcy proceedings on February 26, 2002. 55 On March 7, 2002, the Province publicly alleged that ABA
had abandoned the service, and on March 12, 2002, the Province terminated the concession agreement, alleging ABA's fault. 56
B.

AZURIX'S CLAIM THAT ARGENTINA BREACHED THE FAIR AND
EQUITABLE TREATMENT STANDARD

Azurix argued that the fair and equitable treatment standard is independent of the customary international minimum standard and claimed
Argentina breached the standard by its disinvestment and continuous interruptions with the operations of the concession. Azurix refers to article

II(2)(a) of the U.S.-Argentina BIT, which provides that "[i]nvestment
shall at all times be accorded fair and equitable treatment, shall enjoy full
47. Id.
48. Id.

125.

49. Id.
50. Id. J[ 161.
51. Id. 91162.
52. Id. 913.

53. Id.

244.

54. Id.

55. Id.
56. Id.

245.
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protection and security and shall in no case be accorded treatment less
than that required by international law." 57 Additionally, the BIT includes this treatment in its preamble: "[a]greeing that fair and equitable
treatment of investment is desirable in order to maintain a stable framework for investment and maximum effective use of economic resources" 58 Azurix argued that the text of article II(2)(a) does not refer to
the minimum standard, that "[tiheterms 'fair and equitable treatment'
envisage conduct which goes far beyond the minimum standard and afobjecford protection to a greater extent and according to a much more
59
tive standard than any previously employed form of words."
Azurix also provided a textual argument, claiming that the comma separating the phrase "fair and equitable treatment" from the remainder of
article II(2)(a) of the BIT indicates a sequence of standards and strongly
standard
suggests that fair and equitable treatment is an 6independent
0
from the treatment required by international law.
C.

ARGENTINA'S RESPONSE

Argentina argued that the standard of fair and equitable treatment is
not different from the minimum international standard. Argentina relied
on Genin to argue that the standard "constitutes a minimum international
standard," and "for it to be violated it is necessary that the State receiving
the investment incur in acts that demonstrate a premeditated intent to
not comply with an obligation, insufficient action falling below international standards or even subjective bad faith."'6 1 Argentina also expressed agreement with the Free Trade Commission's interpretation of
article 1105(1) of NAFTA, which prescribes that "[t]he concepts of 'fair
and equitable treatment'

. . .

do not require treatment in addition to or

international law minibeyond that which is required by the customary
62
mum standard of treatment of aliens."
D.

CONCLUSION OF THE TRIBUNAL ON THE FAIR AND EQUITABLE
TREATMENT STANDARD

The tribunal separated Azurix's fair and equitable treatment breach
claim into the following two issues:
(1) [wjhether the standard of fair and equitable treatment is a standard which entails obligations for the parties to the BIT in the treatment of foreign investment which are additional to those required by
57. Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment,
U.S.-Arg., Nov. 14, 1991, S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-2, art. II(2)(a).
58. Id. Preamble para. 4.
59. Azurix Corp., ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/12, 325 (quoting F.A. Mann,
British Treaties for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 52 BRIT. & B.
INT'L LAW 244 (1982)).

60. Id.
61. Id.

326.
333 (internal quotations omitted).

62. Id.

334.
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the minimum standard of treatment of aliens under customary international law;
(2) [w]hat conduct attributable
to the State can be characterized as
63
unfair and inequitable?
In discussing the first issue, the tribunal first noted the Vienna Convention's requirement that a treaty be "interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in
their context and in the light of its object and purpose. ' 64 The tribunal
found that under the ordinary meaning and under the purpose and object
of the BIT, 'fair and equitable" should be "understood to be treatment in
an even-handed and just manner, conducive to fostering the promotion of
foreign investment. The text of the BIT reflects a positive attitude to' 65
wards investment with words such as "promote" and "stimulate.'
The tribunal also found Azurix's textual argument of the fair and equitable treatment clause to be persuasive:
The clause, as drafted, permits to interpret fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security as higher standards than required by international law. The purpose of the third sentence is to
set a floor, not a ceiling, in order to avoid a possible interpretation of
these standards below what is required by international law.66
The tribunal noted that the F-IC's interpretation of article 1105 of
NAFTA shows that "the meaning of that article and similar clauses in
other agreements could reasonably be understood to have a different
'67
meaning.
In discussing the applicable fair and equitable treatment standard
under the U.S.-Argentina BIT, the tribunal concluded that the "standards
of conduct agreed by the parties to a BIT presuppose a favorable disposition towards foreign investment, in fact, a pro-active behavior of the State
to encourage and protect it. To encourage and protect investment is the
purpose of the BIT."'68 The tribunal further concluded that it would be
"incoherent with such purpose and the expectations created by such a
document to consider that a party to the BIT has breached the obligation
of fair and equitable treatment only when it has acted in bad faith or its
conduct can be qualified as outrageous or egregious. '69
Based on these conclusions, the tribunal held that Argentina did
breach the BIT under the fair and equitable treatment standard. The
convincing facts important to the tribunal to support its finding that Argentina violated the standard were: (1) the conduct of the Province after
Azurix gave notice of termination of the concession agreement; (2) the
politicization of the tariff regime because of concerns with the forthcom63.

64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. J 358.

Id. 359 (quoting Vienna Convention, supra note 4, at 331, 8 I.L.M. at 679).
Id. 360.
Id. 91361.
Id. 9 363.
68. Id. 9%
372.
69. Id.
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ing elections; and (3) the repeated calls by the Provincial Governor and
other officials for non-payment of bills by customers, which the tribunal
noted, verged on bad faith "when the Province itself had not completed
the works that would have helped to avoid the problem in the first
'70
place."
The ICSID Tribunal unanimously decided that Argentina (1) breached
article II(2)(a) of the BIT "by failing to accord fair and equitable treatment to Azurix's investment," (2) "failed to accord full protection and
security" under article II(2)(a) of the BIT, and (3) breached article
II(2)(b) of the BIT "by taking arbitrary measures that impaired Azurix's
compensause and enjoyment of its investment. ' 71 The tribunal awarded
72
tion to Azurix in the amount of $165,240,753 plus interest.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Azurix Tribunal broadly defined the fair and equitable treatment
standard to require "pro-active behavior" by the host State to encourage
and protect foreign investment. This broader definition is encouraging to
foreign investors. The tribunal's decision is not a landmark evolution of
the standard, but a mere step closer to possible independence of the fair
and equitable treatment standard from the tie to the customary international minimum standard. As the tribunal clearly noted in Azurix, the
language and context of the BIT is key in the interpretation of the standard. A foreign investor will enjoy this grant of further protection if the
BIT is textually structured with the fair and equitable treatment provision
separate from that of the customary international minimum standard provision, and the BIT does not provide clarifying language that there are no
further obligations beyond the minimum standards.

70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.

374-76.
442.
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